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Summary findings
This paper introduces a large new cross-country database  Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is
on political institutions: the Database on Political  more likely to survive under parliamentary governments
Institutions (DPI).  than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh summarize key  the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises
variables (many of them new), compare this data set with  puzzles for f'uture research.
others, and explore the range of issues for which the data  Similarly, Roubini and Sachs find that divided
should prove invaluable.  governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits
Among the novel variables they introduce:  after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI
* Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and  indicators of divided government indicates otherwise,
balances.  again suggesting issues for future research.
*  Identification of parties with the government  Among questions in political science and economics
coalition or the opposition.  that this database may illuminate: the determinants of
* Fragmentation of opposition and government  democratic  consolidation, the political conditions for
parties in legislatures.  economic reform, the political and institutional roots of
The authors illustrate the application  of DPI variables  corruption,  and the elements of appropriate and
to several problems in political economy.  institutionally sensitive design of economic policy.
This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort
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psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/
research/workingpapers.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  tbeck(@worldbank.org,  gclarke@aworldbank.org,
pkeefer@worldbank.org,  or pwalsh@Cworldbank.org.  February 2000.  (46 pages)
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Introduction
The investigation  of the institutional and political roots of government decisions  has
accelerated  rapidly in the last twenty or more years. However, cross-country  empirical work
has been handicapped  by a lack of detailed data on the political and institutional characteristics
of countries, and their change  over time. Comparative political  economy, therefore, has been
restricted  to small-sample  case  studies,  important in their own right, but imposing
unavoidable  limits on researchers  seeking  to generalize  their results beyond the case  study
sample.
The lack of data has been a serious  obstacle  to better understanding  of numerous areas
in political  economy, including  the political  conditions under which governments promote
rather than retard economic  development. Despite evidence  that institutions underpin
economic  development,  we are still far away from the answers  to two fundamental questions:
Which political institutions are most conducive  to development  and reform? And under what
conditions do such institutions emerge? Unfortunately, cross-country  data that could help to
answer these questions,  data that provided a disaggregated  picture of a country's political
institutions and operations, have been scarce. In this article we introduce a new data set that
fills many of these data gaps,  the Database  on Political Institutions (DPI). It has been
compiled  in the Development Research  Group of the World Bank, but it rests on an
intellectual  foundation laid by a large  body of political economy research.
The DPI contains 113  variables  (detailed  in Annex 1)  for 177  countries over the years
1975-95.  The variables  provide details  about elections,  electoral  rules, type of political system,
party composition of the opposition and government coalitions,  and the extent of military
influence  on government. The DPI also contains a number of new variables,  compiled from3
the raw data, including original  measures  of checks and balances  and political stability.
In contrast to other databases,  these variables are nearly  all objective  and their
construction is entirely transparent. They are also disaggregated,  allowing  researchers  to get
away  from such useful but broad indicators of countries as whether they allow elections or
not, whether elections are "free", or whether the executive  is "constrained." Instead, the DPI
allows researchers  to use precise  and concrete institutional features  of countries, and to
combine them in ways appropriate  to theories they are examining.
In this paper, we identify numerous and policy-relevant  research  directions where this
data will be helpful. We also describe  the different variables  and demonstrate their utility in
several  applications. For example,  we find that earlier results  concerning  the impact of
divided government on public debt (Roubini and Sachs,  1989),  and the impact of
presidentialism  vs. parliamentarism  on democratic consolidation (Stepan  and Skach, 1993),
change  considerably  when their methodologies  are replicated  using the DPI's variables  on
divided  government, presidentialism  and parliamentarisrn. The remainder of the paper, and
the annexes,  provide details on sources  and collection methodology.
The need for cross-country institutional  data
-A large and diverse  array of inquiries into the political economy of economiQm
development and the determinants of institutional change  have  been hindered by the absence
of detailed  cross-national  objective  data on the institutional and political characteristics  of
countries. A few of the areas  of investigation  to which the DPI can contribute are outlined
here.
Political Business  Cycles. Research  on the existence  and importance  of a political business
cycle  has largely focused  on a select  group of developed  countries. One reason for the narrow4
focus has been the absence  of election data in a larger sample  of countries. The Database  on
Political Institutions has election  dates (month and year) and election winners and losers for
more than 150  countries  since 1975. Both legislative  and executive  elections  are included,  as is
the composition of governments  both before and after elections.
Checks and balances: stability versus decisiveness. The contribution of political  institutions
to economic  policy outcomes  is another important area of research. For example,  divided
governments  or checks  and balances  are thought to have conflicting  influences  on economic
development. One line of research  suggests  that they encourage  budget deficits  and delay
reactions  to crisis. Another line of work finds that they increase  the predictability and
restraint with which governments  regulate firms and citizens. Research  on the first topic (e.g.,
by Roubini and Sachs)  focuses  on a selected  group of OECD countries. Research  on the
second issue has relied  on case  studies (for example,  North and Weingast, 1989,  study the
introduction of institutional checks  following the Glorious Revolution in England),  or on
subjective  data, such as  the extent of "executive  constraints" in a country (e.g.,  Keefer  and
Knack, 1997). The DPI includes  several  objective  measure  of checks  and balances  that permit
the impact of this institutional feature of countries to be systematically  analyzed,  and the
tradeoffs between stability and decisiveness  to be investigated.
Electoral rules,  policy maker incentives, and corruption  and fiscal policy.  Another set of
theories in political economy predict that pork barrel spending  and corruption will vary
systematically  both with the number of decision makers (Rasmusen  and Ramseyer, 1994)  and
with the electoral rules by which decision makers are selected  (Cox and McCubbins,
forthcoming). Tests of these theories are made difficult  by the absence  of cross country data
on both of these institutional dimensions. This data set goes  some distance  in remedying  this5
problem. First, it provides  a better approximation of the number of key decision makers  in a
country through two variables  on the number of checks  and balances. Second,  it presents
information on voting rules in countries, including the use of plurality and/or proportional
systems,  closed or open list systems,  threshold or D'HondLt  systems,  and the relative
dominance of these systems  if more than one is used.
Political stability, political tenure, and government  policy.  Government officials  may also
make decisions  that retard development because  their policy horizons are limited to their time
in office. The shorter the horizon of officials,  the more likely it is that they will take actions
with significant  long-run costs to obtain modest short-run benefits. All existing  analyses  of
the impact of leader horizons (for example, Alesina,  et al., 1996,and  Clague, et al., 1996)  rely
on executive  turnover measures. However, in systems  in which the prime minister or
president is not the only veto player, these turnover measures  present a biased  picture of the
horizons of all veto players. In particular, in countries with multiple veto players, the
replacement  of a president, prime minister, or even a cabinet, does not always  mean that all
veto players from the previous government have changed. Often, some of the parties  that
exercised  a veto role in earlier governments reappear  in successor  coalitions. This database
allows-more  nuanced turnover indicators to be constructed,  and presents two such-indicators.
Civil war, ethnic conflict and political institutions. The conditions under which ethnic
groups are in conflict and that this conflict leads  to violence  are a continuing and important
focus of research (see,  e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 1999). However, political institutions are
likely to have both a significant  influence  on whether ethnic groups encounter conflicts  of
interest and on whether those conflicts precipitate violence. Institutions affect  whether
different groups have a voice in the allocation of state resources;  they also affect  the credibility6
of assurances  provided  by one ethnic or other interest group to another (Weingast,  1998). The
DPI has information  bearing on both of these issues.
Electoral  rules, such as voting thresholds and other choices regarding  the aggregation
of votes, influence  whether minority interests are more or less  likely to be influential  in the
formation and dissolution  of governments - and hence, more or less  likely to abandon formal,
institutional channels  for the resolution of their grievances. Similarly,  the existence  of
multiple veto players  - checks  and balances  - should make it more likely that any given  ethnic
or other interest group has the ability to block state actions that are to its detriment. This is
the essence  of institutional arrangements that enhance  credibility.
Electoral  competitiveness  and policy outcomes. To the extent that the "losers"  from
economic reform are politically influential  - are key constituents of political  decision  makers
- reform is less  likely. This is a truism of political  economy, but it leads  to a still  unanswered
question: are politicians  most likely to favor constituents who were supporters in past
elections but deserted  them recently; those whose support is up for grabs and could  swing the
next election one way or the other; or core supporters who never abandon them under any
circumstances?  All of these possibilities  receive  some theoretical and empirical  support (see
Dixit and Londregan,  1996,  and Schady, 1998).
A simpler question, which is similarly unanswered, is whether greater competition in
contests for political  office  increases  or reduces  the willingness  to reform. Faced  with the
prospect of more competitive  elections,  politicians  might be more sensitive  to redistributive
concerns and less  likely to reform. However, politicians  who feel few competitive  pressures
to reform may be more likely to engage  in policies  that benefit them and their core  supporters
at the expense  of the rest of society. In the latter case,  greater electoral competitiveness  might7
lead to greater willingness  to pursue policies  that are less disproportionately beneficial  to them
and their core supporters. Several  variables  in this datab-ase,  ranging  from indices  of electoral
competitiveness,  to the vote shares of parties and directly elected  executives,  permit cross-
country investigation  into questions such as these.
Poverty alleviation and voice.  The construction of a safety net for the poor, or of programnLs
that allow the poor to build human and financial  capital  to rise out of poverty, is often
distorted by political imperatives. Pritchett and Gelbach (1997),  for example,  have  providecd
evidence and theory indicating  that targeting assistance  to the poorest is unsustainable  over
time.  In a simple majority-rule  setting, they show that the less  poor majority eventually
demand more expansive  coverage  of targeted programs as a condition for their continued
support of them. However, the structure of political institutions can mitigate  - or exacerbate
- this outcome. The rules governing election to the US Congress,  for example,  give  an
incentive to legislators  representing  the inner city and to those representing farming districts
to agree on the continued provision of narrowly targeted food stamps. Such  incentives  are less
strong in countries where legislators  represent broader segments  of society, most of whom
gain little or lose  from targeted assistance. The DPI contains variables  that help to capture
some ofthe institutional features  that would affect  the sustainability  of targeting,  including the
presence  of legislatures  and rules governing election  to legislative  chambers.
Economic tradeoffs  in constitution  drafting.  When tremendous institutional transformations
occur, from totalitarianism  to democracy, or even  from one constitution to another, they
entail numerous detailed  decisions  from among a broad array of institutional choices. Here,
again, the empirical  evidence  that should inform these choices - e.g., which electoral  rules?
how should the executive  be selected?  - has been largely  unavailable. As a consequence,8
decisions  about large issues  - should a system be presidential or parliamentary?  - and smaller
but still important issues  - how high should voting thresholds be, which rules of proportional
representation  should be adopted - tend to rest on intuition and political  self-interest,
uninformed by empirical evidence  about the later consequences  of these choices  for growth,
development,  or social conflict. Variables  in the DPI should contribute to accelerated
empirical  research on such questions.
The Variables
The variables  in this dataset  provide considerable  scope for improving our ability to
answer  these questions. The more than one hundred different  variables  can be divided into
seven  general  categories. Each category,  if not each variable, is described  in this section.
1. Political system and electoral  competitiveness
Two fundamental  characteristics  of a political system are the relationship  of the
executive  and legislative  branches,  and the competitiveness  of elections  of the political actors
who occupy them. The DPI has information on both.  With regard to the first, the variable
SYSTEM  was created  to capture whether countries are presidential,  assembly-elected
presidential,  or parliamentary. Determining whether political systems  are presidential or not
depends.  on answers  to a number of questions. Our judgements  are similar  to those-of others,
but were modified  to take into account  our particular sources.
The first question is straightforward:  is there a single  executive  elected  by popular
vote? If both are true, the system  is coded as 'presidential."  However, there are countries in
which both a prime minister and a president are in place, or where the executive  is elected by
the legislature  but is called a president  and enjoys the same degree  of independence  from the9
legislature,  after election, as the typical  popularly-elected  president. Countries with these
characteristics  were coded in the following  way.
For chief executives  who were called  presidents and who were elected  by the assembly,
as in Bolivia,  we ask whether the assembly  can easily recall him or her. If they need a two-
thirds vote to impeach, or are required to dissolve  themselves  in order to force out the
executive,  then the country is characterized  as having an "assembly-elected  president."
Otherwise, the country is characterized  as "parliamentary."
Where  there are both a president  and a prime minister, we ask, how likely would it be
for the president's  view on legislation  to prevail over that of the prime minister? This led us
to place  greater weight on legislative  powers of the president. We distinguish  whether the
system was presidential or parliamentary  with a three-part test. First, can the president veto
legislation  that the parliament can override only with a supermajority? If so, the country is
coded as presidential  despite the presence  of a prime minister. Second,  in the event that
presidents  lack this veto power, we ask whether they can appoint and dismiss  cabinet
ministers (including  the prime minister)  and dissolve  the assembly. If they can do both, the
system is again  characterized as presidential. Finally, in those few cases  where these details are
not revealed  in the source material, if the source material refers  consistently  to the-president
rather than the prime minister as the important decision maker, the system  is again classified
as presidential  (as in Romania and Kyrgyzstan). The data is thoroughly annotated to identify
these rare cases.
These decision rules led us to code Portugal and France as parliamentary rather than
presidential  systems. Others (Shugart  and Carey (1992),  Shugart  (1995))  place greater weight
on non-legislative  presidential powers, such as the right to appoint cabinet members, and10
therefore label these countries as presidential. Although policy  making in France under
divided  executive  control seems  to support our interpretation, legitimate  reasons  exist  to use
other categorization  criteria. One advantage  of the DPI lies in its explicit statement of the
rules we employ, allowing  researchers  to determine more easily  the adequacy  of variables  to
their conceptual  requirements.
The database  also contains  variables  that characterize  the competitiveness  of elections
in countries. The earlier discussion  outlined the potential importance of electoral
competitiveness  to political economy  investigations:  the policy  choices of politicians  are likely
to be influenced  by the likelihood that those choices  will lead  to their replacement. In
addition, in the creation of checks  and balances  variables,  it matters a great deal whether the
legislative  and executive  branches  of government are independent  of each other.  If legislative
elections  as a whole are non-competitive,  it is usually  the case  that the executive  - or whoever
chooses  the executive  - also exercises  decisive  influence  over the legislature. Consequently,
the legislature  is less  of a check on executive  behavior. Finally, investigations  of institutional
change,  particularly of change  to more democratic decision making, need to accurately
characterize  the institutional environment. Knowing the formal, constitutional rules
governing  countries is one way to characterize  democracy;  an important supplement is to
know whether these rules are applied  in practice. The Indices  of Electoral Competitiveness
address  both of these issues.
There are two such indices  in the data set, one for executive  and one for legislative
elections.  The core of the two indices  is the number of parties  that could and did compete in
the last election.  Ferree and Singh (1999)  present the first effort to code such variables,  and our
indices  are based  on theirs. They classify  46 African countries on a six point scale (one  to six).11
The highest  score (six)  on their scale  goes to countries in which multiple parties compete  in
elections,  even if they do not win seats. For the DPI, we collected  sufficient information  to
replicate  this type of indicator for more than 100  additional countries. However, for wider
application of their indices  we added a seventh point to the scale,  in order to identify  variation
among  the large number of countries that exhibit elections  where multiple parties run but
only one party enjoys great  success. Countries receive  a seven  that have elections  in which
multiple parties compete and the largest  party receives  less  than 75 percent of the vote.
Conceptually,  this distinction  captures institutional or informal biases  against  political
competitors that are not revealed  in our sources;  empirically,  this seventh category generates
much more variability among  countries outside of Africa. The scale, then, is:
1  no executive/legislature
2  unelected executive/legislature
3  elected, one candidate
4  one party, multiple candidates
5  multiple parties are legal,  but only one won seats (because  other parties  did not
exist, compete, or win seats).
6  multiple parties competes  and won seats (but one party one 75 percent or more
of the seats)
7  the largest  party received  less  than 75 percent of the seats.
As with distinctions  between presidential and parliamentary systems of government,
numerous subtleties  arise in assessing  scores  for these indices. They are thoroughly detailed in
the documentation accompanying  the database. For example,  many countries have executives
who are indirectly elected. In our rating scheme, they receive  the same competitiveness  score
as the body that elects  them. Therefore, in a parliamentary system,  executive  elections  are as
competitive  as legislative  elections. When there is an electoral  college,  elections are as
competitive  as membership in the electoral  college. If the executives  themselves  appoint the
electoral college,  the systems  are scored as two, on a scale  of one to seven. Competitively12
elected  prime ministers  get six or seven. The chief executives  of Communist nations (the
chairman of the Communist  Party) are assigned  a three, because  they are elected  by the Party
Congress, an electing  body which they do not appoint. Executives  elected by small,  appointed
juntas or by appointed  electoral  colleges  receive  a two.  Countries that allow referenda  on
unelected executives  are scored as three.
Three other variables  supplement these indices. First, elections may be competitive,
but the military may nevertheless  wield significant  power behind the scenes. To get at this,
we have two variables  indicating  whether the chief  executive  and the minister of defense,
respectively,  are military officers. Second,  our sources  often mention voting irregularities  or
candidate intimidation that are serious enough to affect  electoral outcomes,  though coverage  is
far from complete. We record such references  irrespective  of whether claims  that fraudulent
elections have occurred  are based only on the allegations  of the opposition or are supported by
independent international  observers. Non-constitutional irregularities  are also recorded  as
present when important parties boycott elections  or the election results.
One application  of these variables  is to the debate over whether presidential  or
parliamentary systems  are more likely to lead to democratic  consolidation. Stepan  and Skach
(1993),for example,  argue  that parliamentary systems  are more likely to be associated  with
long-running democracy  than are presidential  systems. They offer as evidence  the fact that of
53 non-OECD countries, 22 were democratic  for at least 10 consecutive  years, and of these, 17
were parliamentary. Variables  from the DPI suggest  a different picture, however. Table 1
indicates a breakdown  parallel to theirs using a different  indicator of democracy (countries
that score at least six on the Legislative  Index of Electoral  Competitiveness),  and the SYSTEM
variable, and applying  these two variables  to a large group of non-OECD countries  from 197513
- 1995. In contrast to their findings, the sample  of countries that have experienced  at least ten
continuous years  of democracy  is evenly split between presidential  and parliamentary systems
(22 countries in each),  rather than weighted  in favor of parliamentary systems. Table 1 does
not necessarily  refute the argument in Stepan  and Skach (1993). It does suggest  that with more
extensive  institutional databases,  research can begin to accommodate  new levels  of hypothesis-
building in institutional analysis,  especially  hypotheses  that can explain such different  findings
as those in Table 1.
Table 1: Presidentialism, parliamentarism,  and democratic consolidation among non-
OECD countries
Regime type during the democratic  period
(Legislative  Index of Electoral  Competitiveness
greater  than 5)
Presidential  Parliamentary  Indirectly-
elected
president
(DPI)  or semi-
presidential
(Stepan-Skach)
Non-OECD countries  DPI Indicators  68  40  14
that were democratic  (1975 - 95, 122
at least one year  countries)
during 1975  - 1995  Stepan-Skach  28  25  0
(1973  - 89, 53
countries)
Number of non-  DPI Indicators  22  22  5
OECD countries that  (1975 - 95, 47
were continuously  countries)
democratic for at least
ten consecutive  years.  Stepan-Skach  5  17  0
(1973-89,  22
countries)
Note:  This replicates  Table 3, Stepan and Skach (1993),  using  variables  from the Database on Political
Institutions (DPi). Countries are 'democratic" if they score more than 5 on the Legislative  Index of Electoral
Competitiveness. Regime  type scores  are from the SYSTEM  variable,  where 0 - Presidential,  1  indirectly
elected and 2 - Parliamentary.14
2. Preferences  andparties
For most political economy questions, one is interested in the structure of political
decision making and also in the policy preferences or ideological leanings of decision makers.
Preferences are difficult to discern even in a small sample of countries.  In the US literature,
the most rigorous attempts at assessing  preferences have relied on voting records of legislators.
In the literature on European  politics, impressive progress in comparative politics has been
made on the basis of labor-intensive efforts to  review and classify the platforms of political
parties (see, for example, Laver and Shepsle). For many countries  of the world, though,  such
information  is not available, not germane, or not a reliable indicator of decision maker
preferences.
A starting point for any analysis that requires preferences of policy makers is the party
identification of decision makers.  Our data set identifies the party of the prime minister
and/or  president, the three largest parties in the government  coalition, and the largest party in
the opposition.  In addition,  our sources provide useful information  for some countries  about
the policy preferences of key decision makers on five different dimensions:  economic,
nationalistic, regional, rural, religious.  These dimensions were chosen because they do not
necessarily correlate with  each other: religious or nationalistic parties adopt both left and right
wing economic policies; some religious parties are not nationalistic and some are; etc. That  is,
we intended, where possible, to allow for a multi-dimensional  policy space. Coverage is far
from exhaustive, unfortunately,  but constitutes the most comprehensive characterization  of
parties and decision makers that can be extracted from the sources upon which we relied.
Detailed information  on party platforms  (even on the existence of written  party
platforms) is unavailable for most countries from our primary  sources (Political  Handbook of15
the World  and the Europa  Year  Book). We therefore first asked  whether the orientation of a
party was immediately  obvious from its name. If it was not, or if our primary sources
disagreed  about orientation, we consulted  a European website  mantained by Agora Telematica
(http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/parties.htm) edited by Wilfried  Derksen. Its coverage  is
non-historical,  however. Party orientation was also cross-checked  against  with information in
Political  Parties  ofAfrica and the  Middle  East  and Politica!  Parties  of Eastern  Europe,  Russia,  and
the Successor  States,  both published  by Longman Current; Affairs  series. In the rare cases  where
conflict emerged  among  these sources,  we used the web site and noted the conflict  in the Excel
spreadsheet.
The first categorization  refers  to preferences  regarding  greater or less  state control of
the economy - the standard left-right  scale. Parties on t'he right are therefore those with the
terms "conservative"  or "Christian democratic"  in their names,  or that are labeled  right-wing
in our sources. Similarly,  we classify  parties as left if their names reveal  them to be
communist, socialist,  or social democratic  or if the sources  label them as left-wing.  We classify
parties as centrist that are called centrist by our sources or if their position can best be
described  as centrist (e.g.,  because  the party advocates  the strengthening  of private enterprise
but also-supports  a redistributive role for government,  for example  in the form of a tightly
knit safety  net). Any party that cannot be classified  in aLny  of the three categories  is
categorized  as "other". These are frequently parties in non-competitive  electoral  systems.
The second dimension we consider is "nationalism". A party or the chief executive  is
coded as nationalist if (i) a party is listed or described as nationalist in our sources,  or (ii) a
primary component of the party's platform is the creation or defense  of a national or ethnic
identity.  With respect  to the latter, parties that fought ifor  independence  from a colonial16
power, such as the Indian National Congress,  or advocate  the restriction of rights of
minorities, such as the French National Front Party, are notable examples.
A third dimension coded  in the DPI is whether a party is rural or not.  A party is
classified  as rural if either the platform or the constituency  is mainly rural. Finland's and
Sweden's  Center Parties are prominent examples of rural parties. Similarly,  a party is
classified  as regional if either the platform or the constituency  pertains mainly to a specific
region of the country.  Examples  include most of the Belgian  parties, since separate  parties
exist in the Wallonian and the Flemish part of the country.
Finally, we classify  a party as religious if government policy  towards religion  or the
members of a particular religion  are among the party's core issues. We distinguish such parties
using, once again,  the source characterizations  of either the party's platform or constituency.
In predominantly Islamic  countries, parties are defined  as religious  if the chief executive  or
party leader is also a religious  leader,  as is the case  in Iran. The database  also captures,  among
others, religious  parties in Israel,  the Buddhist Komeito party in Japan and the Hindu-based
Bharatiya  Janata Party (BJP)  in India. With respect to Christian-Democratic  parties, if any
one of our sources indicated  that religious  issues  were a central part of their party platform,
they aremindicated  as Christian. Both the Italian and German Christian Democratic  parties are
therefore coded as having  religion  as an important element of party orientation. Since
religious  issues  are arguably  not the most central or salient concern of party members,  this
suggests  that this variable  is somewhat  biased towards identifying a religious  orientation where
none exists. On the other hand, for social policy issues,  or on questions  such as immigration,
the coding is likely to distinguish  these parties from others in the respective  political  systems
in ways that are both relevant and useful.17
3. Tenure, turnover and popular vote share of the Chief Executive and the Chief Executive's
Party
A key hindrance to development is the tendency of many political leaders  to make
opportunistic decisions  that entail long run costs to society  that far outweigh short-run
benefits. The expropriation, directly or via taxation or regulatory  policy, of private assets  is
the most obvious example of such decision making. Leaders  with shorter horizons in office
are more likely to find such  choices  to be worthwhile, and there is evidence suggesting  that
this effect  is significant,  at least  in less  democratic countries (Clague,  et al., 1996;  see  also
Alesina,  et al., 1996). All research  that has documented  this effect  has relied on data on the
tenure and turnover of governments  (cabinets  or prime rninisters  in parliamentary systems)  or
presidents. This information  is available  in this data set, as well, for larger number of
countries than previously available. However, the DPI also provides opportunities to
circumvent several  ambiguities  that arise  from reliance on existing  data.
First, executives  whose terms are shortened by constitutional  limits on tenure might
react differently  to limits on their time in office compared to other executives,  with similar
horizons that are limited in other, perhaps non-constitutional  ways. This data set therefore
includes  variables  indicating  whether there are constitutional restrictions  on executive  terms
and whether sitting executives  can be re-elected.
Second,  executives  with a stronger hold on power should, all else equal, have  a longer
horizon than other executives. In particular, one would expect  leaders  with more popular
support, or weak opposition, to have  a longer horizon.  The strength of the political position
of leaders can be taken into account, at least partially, using  variables  that record the share of
votes  that presidents received  in their last election, and the share of votes of the prime18
minister's  or president's  party.
Third,  one would  expect  that stronger  parties  would rein  in party  members  who
happen  to have  shorter  horizons. Again,  the DPI provides  information  that allows  this to be
taken  into account:  the number  of years  that the party of the executive  has  been  in office
(independent  of  the particular  executive  who has  represented  the party),  and  how long  the
party has  existed  under its current  name. Where  the party of the executive  has  been  in power
longer  than the executive,  it is more  likely  that the party restrains  executives  with short
horizons. Similarly,  parties  that have  been  in existence  for a long  period  of  time should  have  a
longer  time  horizon  than parties  that have  not. We  count the party's  existence  from the date
it adopted  its name. Parties  incur  losses  when  they change  their name,  not least  of which is a
loss  of brand  name. Frequent  name  changes  indicate  either  that parties  have  no brand  name
or are not well-established  institutionally  (to  the extent  that these  two things  are different).
Finally,  existing  investigations  of the effects  of expected  tenure  or government
turnover  track only  one decision  maker  in a country,  the head  of government  (president,
prime  minister  or cabinet).  Most  democratic  countries,  however,  have  multiple  decision
makers. A parliamentary  government  can  fall  and be replaced  by government  with an
entirely-new  set  of coalition  parties,  or by a new  government  with substantially  the same  set
of coalition  partners. A president  can  be replaced  with, or without,  the corresponding
replacement  of the majority  parties  in the legislature.  Theory  would  suggest  that dramatic
changes  in government  policy,  or in the potential  for expropriatory  behavior  by governments,
are likely  only when  all decision  makers  are replaced.  Empirical  measures  of tenure and
turnover  have  not matched  this, however.
The  DPI records  whether  parties  are in the government  coalition  or not, and whether19
the party of the executive  controls the lower house (there is no data on upper houses  in this
data set). With this information, one can calculate  which of the main veto gates legislature,
executive)  in a system  have changed  hands in any year. Based  on this information, the data set
contains two new variables,  STABS and STABNS, on government stability that capture the
extent of turnover in any one year of a government's  key decision makers. They are
calculated  by dividing  the number of exits between year t and t+ 1 by the total number of veto
players in year t.  The variables  are therefore on a 0-1 scaLe,  with zero representing  no exits
and one representing  the exit and replacement  of all veto players. Veto players  are defined  as
the president, largest  party in the legislature,  for a presidential  system; and as the prime
minister and the parties in the government coalition in a parliamentary system.  These
variables,  are correlated at approximately .87 with simple measures  of executive  turnover.
While not dramatically  different,  they are different enough to suggest  that hypothesis  tests
invoking instability should be robust to both types of measures.
Along the same  lines, measures  of tenure length used in current research often refer
only to the executive. The DPI has several  variables  that provide different perspectives  on
tenure, include the tenure of the veto player who has been in office  the longest  and the
shortest-period  of time, assuming  multiple veto players, as well as the tenure of the political
system - how long have executive  elections been competitive  (at least six on the Executive
Index of Electoral Competitiveness)  or, if they have not been competitive, how long the
executive  has been in office.
4. The Legislature
The role of the legislature  in the political process  is influenced  not only by
constitutional restrictions on the scope of its initiative and veto authority, but also by its20
composition and the relative strength of government and opposition coalitions. Currently, in
order to characterize  the internal structure of legislators,  researchers  have had to rely on
measures  of fractionalization  of the legislature: the probability that any two legislators  drawn
at random would belong to the same  party. Greater fragmentation  is taken to imply a larger
number of actors willing to act independently  in the consideration  of any given policy change.
This variable  has proven useful, but it treats as identical  highly dissimilar  cases. For example,
the variable  would record the same  value for two legislatures: the first, in which a single
opposition party controls 49 percent of the seats, 10 government  parties share 49 percent of
the seats,  and a remaining government party controls 2 percent of the seats and a second,  in
which a single  government party controls 49 percent of the seats  with a coalition partner that
controls 2 percent, while 10  opposition parties share  49 percent of the seats.
The data set introduced here allows for the calculation  of the traditional measure of
legislative  fragmentation. However, our sources also allowed  us to identify which parties
were inside and outside of the governing  coalition. For coalition  governments,  the sources
generally  list the party affiliations  of cabinet ministers. Otherwise,  the country descriptions
provided this information. Where the information was not available,  for a small number of
parties  -nd countries, this is indicated  in the DPI.  With this information, variables  were
created  to record separately  the fragmentation of the government coalition and the
opposition. The correlation of the government and opposition fragmentation measures  is
only 0.267,  suggesting  that average  fragmentation  for the entire legislature  is likely to be
misleading  for many purposes. For example,  the number of checks  (parties  in a government
coalition)  in parliamentary systems  cannot be reliably inferred from fragmentation of the
whole legislature. Similarly,  in investigations  of the relative influence  of executives  and21
legislatures  when legislatures  become more fragmented,  the relevant issue  is the fragmentation
of government-allied  parties, on which the DPI has information.
5. Electoral  Rules
The incentives  of political decision  makers, and their ability to act independently  of
each other, depends  in large measure on the electoral  rules under which they operate. Among
other effects,  electoral  rules influence  whether candidates  have an incentive  to pursue
individual or party interests;  whether small and single-interest  parties have an incentive  to
coalesce  or to remain independent; and whether party leaders  exercise  significant  or weak
influence  on party candidates. Each of these and other, similar electoral  characteristics  have a
bearing on whether legislators  are more or less  permeable  to special  interests.
One electoral  rule that affects  responsiveness  to narrow interests is the Mean  District
Magnitude (MDM). The MDM is defined in the database  as the average  number of
representatives  (rounded  to the nearest whole number) elected  by each electoral  district in a
country. 1 Higher values  of MDM (combined  with proportional voting rules)  reduce  the
incentives of parties  to coalesce  and allow parties representing exclusively  narrow interests the
chance to gain a voice in a government coalition. MDM is coded for up to two legislative
chambers (House  and Senate),  if they have elected  members. The MDM varies  fromi  one in
the United States  or the United Kingdom to as many as 153  for the Congo.
A second  electoral  characteristic  that the data set captures is whether the districts of the
upper house are states or provinces. This is particularly useful  in studies of federalism:  the
1 Cox (1997,  p. 208),  argues  that the median district magnitude  is superior, conceptually,  but data on distribution
of seats across  constituencies  is not available  from our sources  and Cox also acknowledges  that empirically,  the
distinction has not proven important.22
more closely  that the constituencies  of national legislators  match those of sub-national
governmental  jurisdictions,  the more likely that those sub-national  interests will be reinforced
in national-level  decision  making.
Voting rules are a third aspect  of electoral rules. The DPI records whether legislators
are elected  using majority (first past the post) or proportional representation  systems. These
rules affect  candidate  incentives  to adhere  to party positions (as in proportional
representation)  and to build up personal constituencies  at the expense  of party positions. If at
least some members of the legislature  are elected  by simple  majority vote, the electoral  system
is coded as "pluralistic." If at least some candidates  are elected  based  on the percentage  of
votes received by their party, the system is coded as proportional representation (PR).
Countries are allowed  to (and do) exhibit both systems;  in this case,  the system that governs
the majority of candidates  is indicated  for each legislative  chamber.
Proportional representation  systems  differ widely  according  to whether they favor
large  or small parties or privilege  party leaders  or individual  candidates  (see  Cox 1997  for a
thorough discussion). The data set therefore records if there is a threshold that parties have  to
overcome in order to gain any seats  in the legislature  and whether the D'Hondt system,  which
is less  -fvorable to small  parties, is used to calculate  the number of seats that each party
receives. There is also a variable  that records whether the electoral  system is closed  or open
list. A system is classified  as closed  if voters cannot express  preferences  within a list - that is,
if the position on a party's candidate  list combined with the number of votes received  by the
party is the sole determinant of whether a candidate  is elected  or not.
Some, albeit scanty information is available  on the candidate  selection  process.
Especially  in majoritarian  settings,  this is a crucial dimension along which countries vary in23
the extent of party control of candidates. Systems  that use "smoke-filled  back rooms" to
identify a party's candidates  offer party leaders  greater influence  than those that use party
primaries. Where possible,  the data set therefore includes a variable  that reflects  whether
selection  is of one of the following  three types:
1  on a national level, i.e. by national executive,  party leader,  interest groups or party
factions;
2  on a sub-national level,  i.e. by subset  of constituency  party members  e.g. on
conventions;
3  by primary election, including  party primary and primaries using all the votes of a
constituency.
The DPI, finally, records the month when presidential/parliamentary  elections were
held.
6. Checks  and Balances
A key element in the description  of any political system is the number of decision
makers whose agreement is necessary  before policies  can.  be changed. Numerous decision
makers with different policy preferences  are likely to respond differently  (more incrementally,
for example)  to reform opportunities  than single  decision makers. On the other hand,
countries with multiple decision  makers may offer greater protection from arbitrary
government  action to individuals  and minorities. Interests that are unrepresented  by
government  decision makers when there are few key decision makers  may gain  representation
when the number of decision makers  rises.
The DPI significantly  extends  one existing measure of checks  and balances,  and
introduces new measures  and the possibility  of constructing others. One existing measure is
the Index of Political Cohesion, originally  devised  and coded by Roubini and Sachs (1989)  for
a set of 14 OECD countries to study the political and economic  origins of high-debt countries.24
They record whether the same  or different  parties  control the executive  and legislature  in
presidential  systems,  and, in parliamentary systems,  whether there is a one, two, or three or
more party coalition  controlling government,  or a minority government. The DPI has
information on governing  and opposition parties for over 150  countries, allowing  the Index of
Political Cohesion to be compiled  for a much larger sample of countries.
There are significant  coding differences  for the 14 overlapping  countries, however, so
that for these common observations  there is a correlation of only .53 between  the two.  For
example, we differ  from the original coding  by Roubini and Sachs  of the Index  in calling  Japan
a minority government  for particular years, in labeling  Finland a parliamentary  system,  and in
coding the CDU and CSU in Germany as two parties rather than one (XXsee  annex xx for a
complete identification  of differences). This has a significant  impact on their empirical
findings,  at least over the ten years that the two versions overlap. Table 2 reports results from
Roubini and Sachs,  replicated  for the years 1975  - 1985,  using their original  coding  of the
Index and the coding  in the database. 2 They argue, reasonably,  that coalition  governments
should have greater  difficulty responding  to the sudden emergence  of crisis-driven  budget
deficits,  a common occurrence in this decade.
-They confirm this conjecture in their empirical  work, replicated in Column 1, Table 2
for the eleven  year period for which the two databases  overlap. The IPC coefficient  is large,
positive and statistically  significant. However, using the coding of the Index of Political
Cohesion from DPI, we find no such relationship  (see  Column 2, Table 2). What explains
these divergent  results? As Table 3 demonstrates,  there are several  reasons  for the differences
2 Our data  on unemployment  and inflation  differ  slightly  from  theirs,  but despite  this,  in our replication  using
their own coding  of IPC  we  find as  they do that IPC  has  a large  and  positive  association  with  public  debt.25
in their Index of Political Cohesion and the one coded for the DPI.
Table 2: Divided government  and government debt
Dependent variable:  Original Index of  [PC  from  CHECKSZ
change in public  Political Cohesion  Database  of  from Database
debt/GDP  (IPC)  Political  of Political
(Roubini/Sachs)  Institutions  Institutions
(1)  (2)  (3)
constant  -0.84  0.31  0.18
(0.53)  (0.54)  (0.96)
lagged  change  in  0.867  0.84  0.84
public debt (t-1)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)
change in  0.12  0.0)57  0.06
unemployment rate  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)
change in debt  -0.20  -0.15  -0.17
service  costs  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.18)
change in growth  -0.32  -0.27  -0.32
rate  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0. 1)
Japan (0-1)  2.48  0.67  0.74
(1.55)  (1.47  (1.62)
IPC or CHECKS1  0.74  -0.053  0.02
(0.30)  (0.28)  (0.23)
N  83  79  83
Adjusted  R2 0.54  0.5  0.5
Note:  This table reproduces the specification from Table 7, column 2, Roubini  and Sachs, 1989,  for the
years 1975 - 85 (years of overlap with  our dataset).  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Debt service
costs are the  real interest rate less the growth  rate,  multiplied by lagged debt/GDP.  Column  2 excludes
four observations  (Italy and the US, 1975-76)  for which IPC in the DPI is unavailable.
The coding  differences  noted in Table 2 have  two effects. One is to raise  the sample
mean substantially, from 1.18  to 1.51. The other is to reduce  the dispersion  in the DPI
measure of IPC among the fourteen countries; the IPC compiled  by Roubini and Sachs
exhibits a coefficient  of variation of 83.5, while that of DPI[  is 72.4. These changes  are not
surprising. One would expect  that fourteen wealthy, democratic  OECD countries would
exhibit more significant  checks  on government decision makers  that higher values of the IPC
imply, and that they would not exhibit large and sustained  differences  in such a fundamental
political  variable as the extent of divided government. The effects  of divided government  are26
likely to be non-linear - with the impact of a second independent  decision maker being much
greater than the addition of a third, for example  - providing one explanation  for the
insignificant  results in column 2, Table 3. Similarly,  the reduced dispersion  of the IPC in the
DPI would also  explain the differences  in the results across  columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.
Table 3: Differences  in Coding the Index of Political  Cohesiveness:
Database  of Political Institutions and Roubini and Sachs  (1989)
(OECD  nations,  1975-1985)
Source of Difference  Observations  Affected
DPI counts CDU and CSU as 2 parties; RS89  Federal Republic  of Germany,
counts them as 1.  1983-1985
DPI indicates  2-party government;  RS89  United Kingdom,  1978
indicates  a 1-party government.  Norway, 1975-1980
Sweden,  1975
DPI indicates a minority government;  RS89  Belgium  1982-1985
indicates  a majority government  of one party  Denmark 1978,  1984-1985
or a majority coalition.  Japan 1977-1980,  1984-1985
Norway 1985
Sweden  1983-1985
UK 1977,  1979
DPI indicates a minority government,  RS89  Belgium,  1976-1977
indicates  a majority government  of one party
or a majority coalition. It is also possible  that
language-  based "wings" of parties are treated
differently  - DPI often counts them as separate
parties.
For each year, DPI records the situation as of  Denmark, 1981
January 1; RS89 seem to use a different  Ireland, 1981
convention.  Norway, 1981-1982
Sweden,  1976,  1978-1979,  1981
Possible  that language-based  "wings"  of parties  Netherlands, 1978-1985
are treated differently - DPI often counts them  Belgium, 1981
as multiple parties.
DPI classifies  them as parliamentary;  RS89  Finland, 1975-1985
classifies  as presidential.  France, 1975-198527
One can examine the robustness of the results in column 2 by substituting for IPC a
measure of the number  of independent  decision makers irn  a government.  The underlying
logic of the Roubini and Sachs argument suggests that such a measure, too, should be
correlated with  the difficulty of responding to fiscal crisis.  One such measure in the DPI is
the variable CHECKSI, a measure of checks and balances that is explained below.  Results
using CHECKS1 in place of IPC are displayed in Column 3, Table 2, and again demonstrate  no
significant relationship between the number of decision makers and response to fiscal crisis in
this small and relatively homogeneous sample of countries.
Because of the small and relatively homogeneous number of countries considered, the
results in columns 2 and 3 of course do not reject the Roubini/Sachs  conjecture - divided
governments  have greater difficulties in agreeing to a response to crisis.  They only suggest
that  as we advance in our attempts to make cross-country institutional  characterizations  of
polities, legitimate distinctions  will arise among superficially similar concepts.  On the one
hand, these distinctions need to be subjected to scrutiny; on the other  hand, if they are
reasonable, they need to be used to test the robustness of empirical claims in political
economy.  Where robustness is weak, this likely implies new opportunities  for research:  why
do some measures of checks and balances, following one set of criteria, lead to results that are
not replicable using other reasonable measures of checks and balances, capturing different
institutional  dimensions?
The Index of Political Cohesion  does not distinguish countries  according to the
effectiveness of electoral checks on government  decision makers.  This is a particularly
relevant concern when expanding the index to a set of countries  outside of the OECD.  When28
electoral  checks  are few,  perhaps  because  of laws  limiting  political  competition,  executive
control  of the legislative  apparatus  is usually  strong. Legislative  seats  depend  on party
nomination,  which  in turn is  usually  vested  in the executive  in such  countries. The Index  also
does  not take  into account  electoral  rules  that influence  party control  over members,  an issue
even  in OECD countries. Where  party  control  is weak  and the same  party controls  both the
legislative  and executive  branches  of a presidential  government,  this index  would  understate
the level  of checks  and balances  by coding  the country  as  not having  a divided  government.
To adjust  for these  circumstances,  the DPI includes  two new  variables,  CHECKSI  and
CHECKS2.  These  variables  count  the number  of veto players  in a political  system,  adjusting
for  whether  these  veto  players  are  independent  of each  other,  as  determined  by the level  of
electoral  competitiveness  in a system,  their respective  party affiliations,  and the electoral  rules.
Both  variables  take into account  the Legislative  Index  of  Electoral  Competitiveness.  If the
index  is less  than four, the two measures  are set equal  to one since,  regardless  of the formal
constitutional  arrangements  in a system,  where  legislative  elections  are uncompetitive,
constitutional  checks  on officials  are unlikely  to be binding.
For values  of the electoral  competitiveness  index  of four  or more, the variable
CHECKSI  is  increased  by the number  of veto players  in the system. 3 In presidential  systems,
it is increased  by one for the president  and one for each  legislative  chamber.  However,  if
elections  are conducted  under  closed  list rules  (closed  list equals  one)  and  the president's  party
is the largest  government  party in a particular  chamber,  then it is assumed  that the president
exercises  substantial  control  over  the chamber  and it is not counted  as  a check. For
3 The values  of CHECKS1  and CHECKS2  are nearly invariant to the use  of the Executive  or Legislative  Index
of Electoral  Competitiveness.29
parliamentary systems,  CHECKS1  is increased  by one for the prime minister and the number
of parties in the government coalition, including  the prime minister's own party.  If the
system is closed  list, however, and the prime minister's party is the largest  in the government
coalition, then this sum is reduced by one. Relative  to the Index of Political Cohesion, then,
CHECKS1  allows  a legislative  chamber to exercise  veto power even if the same  party controls
both the chamber and the executive  branch.
Keefer  and Stasavage  (1999)  use CHECKS1  to demonstrate that the delegation  of
monetary policy  to a central bank has a significant  dampening effect  on inflation only in the
presence  of checks  and balances. Keefer  (1999)  finds that the determinants of banking crises
are substantially  different in countries  that exhibit high values of CHECKS1 compared to
those countries  that exhibit lower values.
The variable CHECKSI  can also be used to fuel the debate about whether presidential
or parliamentary  forms of government are likely to result in "decisive"  decision  making.
Some (see  Stepan  and Skach, 1993)  argue that presidential  governments are more likely to give
rise to gridlock,  since neither the legislature  nor the executive  has an incentive  to give  way in
policy debates  because  they are independently  selected. It:  is not clear, however,  which is
more likely: that an independent legislature  would veto the proposals  of an executive,  or that
members of a government coalition in a parliamentary system would veto the same  proposal
emanating from another member of the coalition. The average  CHECKSI  variable  for all
countries that score  either six or seven  on the Legislative  [ndex of Electoral  Competitiveness  is
actually much higher for parliamentary systems  (3.57)  than for presidential  systems
(approximately  1.96). While legislative  and executive  interests are rarely unified in
presidential  systems,  governments in parliamentary systems are even  less  so. However, it30
remains unclear whether bargaining  among multiple coalition  partners in parliamentary
systems regarding  particular proposals is less  costly  than bargaining  between only two veto
players in presidential  systems.  The DPI data set, however, provides one tool for advancing
research on this question.
The extent to which one political decision  maker might act as a check on another
depends in part on the similarity of their policy  preferences. Government decision  makers are
more likely to exercise  strong veto power if their policy preferences  are closer to those of the
opposition and more distant from the preferences  of other government decision  makers. Such
a decision maker would be more willing to leave  the government and join the opposition  than
decision makers  whose views  were far from the opposition. To take into account  the policy
orientation of parties, a second checks  and balances  variable, CHECKS2,  was therefore
compiled and introduced  into the data set.  CHECKS2  is therefore the same as CHECKS1,  but
is augmented  by one for every veto player (defined  as the largest government party in the
legislative  chamber in presidential  systems,  and all coalition members in parliamentary
systems)  whose orientation (left,  right or center) is closer  to the opposition's orientation than
to the average  of the rest of the government. The opposition's orientation is given  by the
orientation of the largest  opposition party.
These new measures  of checks and balances  offer considerable  additional information
about polities. Their correlation with the coding  of Index of Political Cohesion in the
database  is less  than 0.60. This suggests  that theoretical priors about the number of veto
players in government can make a significant  difference  for empirical work, reinforcing  the
need for diverse  data sets  and variables.31
7. Federalism
Sub-national political structure affects national level policy making in numerous  ways.
First, sub-national units may have veto power over national level policy decisions.  Second,
they may exert pressure for greater, or at least different levels of redistribution  than would
otherwise be the case. Third,  their existence may affect the cohesiveness of national parties,
which  struggle for positions  in both sub-national and national jurisdictions,  although the
distribution  of voter preferences in the two could be quite distinct.
There are several variables in the DPI to capture the extent of federalism in a country's
political structure.  The first is whether there are contiguous autonomous regions in a
country.  An autonomous  region is recorded if a source explicitly mentions a region, area or
district that is autonomous  or self-governing. We required that autonomous  regions be
constitutionally  designated as "autonomous",  "independent"  or "special".
A second dimension  of information  on sub-national  governments is whether
state/provincial  governments  are locally elected.  This is zero if neither the local executive nor
the local legislature are directly elected by the local population  that they govern; one if either
is directly elected and the other is indirectly elected (e.g., by councils at subsidiary levels of
government)  or appointed; and two if they are both  directly and locally elected.  If there are
multiple levels of sub-national  government, we consider the highest level as the
"state/province"  level.  We also investigated, with  limited success,  whether  municipal
governments were locally elected.  This was coded the same as the state/provincial
government.  If there were multiple levels of sub-national  government,  we considered the
lowest level as the "municipal"  level.
The third  dimension on which we attempted  to collect information  is the jurisdiction32
of local governments. We asked whether the states or provinces had authority over taxing,
spending, or legislating. The variable is coded  as one if our sources  report authority over any
of these areas.
Sources and Data Collection
There were two main sources of data for this project, each used  for a different  time
period. For the period 1975-1984,  Europa  Year  Book was consulted For the period 1985-1995,
the Political  Handbook  of the World, edited  by Arthur Banks,  was used. However, Europa  was
also used in this second  time period to plug topical  gaps in coverage,  mostly  for electoral rule
and constitutional  framework variables.
There were several  reasons for dividing  our study between two sources. First, prior to
1985,  the Political  Handbook of the World  was published every 2-4 years and lacked detailed,
year-by-year  observations. This factor recommended  Europa  for the first time period. In the
period 1985-1995,  the two books provided complementary information. Europa  has better
data on the number of seats held by parties, the constitutional framework and electoral rules
over this period, while the Handbook offers  more detailed information on the ideological
orientation of the parties and recent political history. Therefore, both sources  were used, with
an emphasis  on the Handbook.
The consistency  of data between these  two time periods was extensively  checked.  The
collection system helped ensure that discrepancies  would be identified  and discussed,  since
different people  were responsible  for coding  different time periods. In the event of
discontinuities  in the 1984  - 85 period, the coders' approaches  were discussed  among a wider
group, including most of the authors of this paper, to determine which was more appropriate,
and the country-variable  was re-coded  accordingly.  Most of these discontinuities  involved33
time-sensitive  variables  (how  long  in office,  in majority,  etc.);  electoral  rule  variables  (closed
list,  plurality/PR);  and  the ideological  orientation  of parties. They  were resolved  largely  by
establishing  and refining  the conventions  of data  collection,  such  as  when  a ruler  was  credited
with taking  office  (in  former  colonies,  upon internal  self-government  rather  than
independence)  or what exactly  constituted  an electoral  rule  (whatever  rule governs  the
majority  of seats).  There  were,  besides,  extensive  consultations  on resolution  of ambiguities.
The results  of these  discussions  are all reflected  either  in the documentation  sheet,  in the form
of rules  that were  followed  for coding,  or in the notes  embedded  in the corresponding  cells  in
the Excel  spreadsheet.
Electoral  rules  were  more  difficult  to capture  than other  institutional  variables,  and
were  often  not available  in the handbooks.  For the later  period  (1985-1995)  we  took most of
our data  from the website  of  the International  Parliamentairy  Union,  which reports  rules  for
1998.  When  this data  matched  the institutions  described  in 1975-1984,  we assumed  that no
changes  had been  made  and  filled  in the intervening  years. In the event  that a system  changed
and  then switched  back,  this introduces  errors. Since  this assumption  was  made  only  when
institutions  from 1984  matched  those  in 1998,  these  cases  are  limited  to very  stable
democracies.  In the case  where  IPU-1998  did not match  earlier  data,  the IPU dat-a  -was  only
inputted  for 1995,  and blanks  were  left  for remaining  years.
There were  a number  of alternative  sources  of data  that could  have  been  used.
Prominent  among  these  is  the Statesman's  Year  Book  edited  currently  by Brian  Hunter.  This  is
a valuable  source,  but we  rejected  it in favor  of  the above  sources  for several  reasons  (recalling
that the addition  of a single  source  to the compilation  process  implied  at least  four  person-
months  of additional  work). First, although  Statesman's  level  of detail  is excellent  in Europe34
and developed  nations, its coverage  of developing  nations is less  detailed  than in our preferred
sources. The number of seats won by parties is more often omitted, as is the identification of
parties as affiliated  with or opposed  to the government. Details on the electoral  systems are
also more often absent, as are vote percentages  for presidential  systems.  Our sources provided
information on seats,  parties, and election results more consistently  in developing  nations.
The reporting in Statesman's  also  lagged  events by a few years, especially  in developing  nations
or nations emerging  from Communism. For example, election  results in countries such as
Kazakhstan  or Kyrgisztan are not covered  until 1995,  compared to 1992  in our preferred
sources. Finally, Statesman's  rarely provided lists or descriptions  of active parties.
Another possible  source for this database  is Keesing's  Record  Of World  Events. This
source was rejected because  it was primarily focused  on news rather than permanent
institutions; and because  it is organized  by month, creating significant  compilation costs -
since  relevant data would have  to be scoured from every month's report. Various other
sources  (CiA Handbook of the  Nations, OECD  Political  Data Handbook  edited by Lane, et al.,
the Year  Book  of World  Affairs, produced by the London Institute of World Affairs)  were
rejected  for reasons of coverage  and focus.
--Despite  the use of comprehensive  sources and detailed cross-checking  procedures, there
are several  variables  which need to be treated with some caution because  of the fundamental
limitations of cross-country  sources  such as those upon which we relied. Party orientation is
one of these, since  we were unable to rely on systematic listings  of party platforms or
legislative  positions. However, since our first-cut source (the party name/description in the
handbooks)  and our default source (the Agora website)  disagreed  infrequently,  we believe
these variables  can be used with confidence.35
Information scarcity  hindered the coding  of all of the federalism  variables. Thirty-
eight percent of the observations  are coded for the sub-national  authority variable,  and 42
percent of the municipal  election variables. The remainder are blank.
The indices  of electoral  competitiveness  were coded according to a carefully  established
set of conventions,  all of which are described  in the docuimentation.  Nevertheless,  there are
many cases  that defied  simple categorization  (all noted either with notes in the Excel
spreadsheet,  or in the documentation). When executives  were elected by a body other than
the overall populace,  we apply the categorization  to that electing  body (often  the legislature,
but sometimes  an electoral  college)  and impute its score to the executive. This results  in
military governments  of Brazil, Thailand, and South Korea receiving  unusually high scores  (5-
7), since  they did not "take" power, but instead  followed formal institutional procedures that
involved selection  by an elected  legislature. Similarly,  even if a powerful executive  rigged  the
elections (which is recorded  elsewhere),  the country could still be scored a six or seven. While
the formal procedures  are likely to understate the level of military control of the process, and
overstate the level of electoral competitiveness,  we preferred to preserve the conventions in
these cases.
-Special rules were devised  to handle deviations  from constitutional procedures. If an
executive  or legislature  illegally  suspends  or ignores elections,  the suspending  entity is scored
with a two starting in the year after the event. If unelected  dictators subsequently  hold a
plebiscite  to confirm their claim to office,  their score  is raised from two to three, but only if
the plebiscite  is binding. Dynastic rulers in Arab countr:ies,  who inherit power, or otherwise
obtain it through obscure  intra-family  negotiations,  are given the same "two" earned by
military officers  who seize  power in a coup.36
The DPI compared  to other databases
The DPI seeks  to add to existing knowledge on political  institutions, and to gather  into
one source information that had previously been scattered. Therefore,  it is reasonable  to ask
how this database  compares  to other political databases,  in terms of detail, coverage,  and focus.
Comparisons  to two illustrate  the potential contribution of the DPI to future empirical
research in cross-country  political  economy. One of these is the Polity IH database  compiled
by Gurr, et al. (1998),  and the other are the objective  assessments  of government checks  and
balances  created by Henisz (1997).
Polity III. Gurr, Jaggers,  and Moore (1998)  have compiled  Polity Im, covering  a time
period stretching from 1800  to 1994.  Polity Im  covers 156  nations - all those with populations
above 500,000  - and 20 areas  that were later amalgamated  into a single nation-state  (Saxony,
Hesse, etc. into Germany; Lombardy, Tuscany, etc. into Italy). By comparison, our database
covers all sovereign  nations with populations above 100,000  -in all, 177  countries, for the
years 1975  - 1995.
Polity III includes numerous subjective  indicators of the political and institutional
environment in countries. However, these tend to be highly aggregated. For example,
subjective  measures  of regulation, competition, and openness  in executive  recruitment
incorporate information about the elections or their absence;  fraud; coups; scope  of
participation in the selection of the executive;  military involvement;  the number of competing
parties; and other relevant factors. The weights assigned  to these different characteristics,  all
of which are appropriate to consider,  are not clear, however. The Polity m  variables
"regulation" and 'competitiveness"  of participation, like most of the Polity III variables,
exhibit similar highly aggregated  characteristics. Implicit in their codings  are evaluations  of37
political violence  and fraud; constituencies  of parties; legality  of parties; and the endurance of
parties over time. Using this aggregate  level  of data organization, many qualities  of the
political system  can be captured by a very few variables,  and the net effect  of formal and
informal (harder  to observe  and codify)  influences  can be summarized. The disadvantage  of
this information is that those seeking  specific  details  on the electoral  system  will find this
information inextricably  entangled  with the other measures  comprising  the variable.
By comparison,  the DPI uses  variables  that reflect only one dimension.  For example,
many variables  are dummies, focusing  on questions such as "is the closed  list system used?", "is
the chief executive  in the military?",  or "was  there electoral fraud?". Examples  of non-dummy
variables  include the seats, ideological  orientation, and government/opposition  affiliation of
political parties;  details on the level of federalism;  the elapsed  time in office  of the chief
executive;  and the timing of elections. This database  thus presents  data at a disaggregated
level. With some exceptions,  the DPI generally  avoids the use of variables  that wrap several
different measures  into one number. The creation of such variables  is left to the user. The
exceptions  to this are the Indices of Electoral  Competitiveness  and the CHECKS variables.
The electoral  competitiveness  variables  take into account rules governing  whether parties can
run and-actual  outcomes - whether parties do run and win seats. The CHECKS variables
draw on several  variables  within the database  to construct an index of checks  and balances  in
the political  system. While our variables  therefore do not necessarily  reflect  the informal
constraints on electoral competition or executive  authority, they allow researchers  to identify
the extent of formal constitutional control on political decision  makers.
In addition to methdological  differences  in the two databases  (subjective  and
aggregated,  but evaluating both formal and informal conditions in a country, compared to38
objective  and disaggregated),  there also differences  in the types of variables  included. Our
database  has no information on "collective  executives",  such as military juntas; nor
information on the scope  of government action or regulation in the polity; nor on the
creation, destruction or nature of regime change  in polities. On the other hand, the DPI
permits users to track more frequent and micro-level  changes  in regimes,  such as the
composition of the legislature,  changes in executive,  or changes  in the electoral
competitiveness  indices. It also features several  dummy variables representing  details  of the
electoral system and much more detail on parties  in the system.
Political constraints.  Henisz (1997)  presents  another valuable  source of information
on political  institutions, in particular the data necessary  to create a measure of checks  and
balances. His series  addresses  some key issues,  such as the number of chambers  in a legislature,
the degree  of federalism,  Supreme Court turnover, factionalization  of the legislature,  and the
relative influence  of different  parties among  the executive,  legislature,  and judicial  branches.
From this information,  he formulates a measure  of political  constraints that is analagous  to,
but different in construction from, the CHECKS variables  reported here. The Henisz data has
a longer time-series,  but substantially  fewer variables  (e.g.,  with regard to government  or
opposition parties,  party orientation, electoral rules,  the different federalism  indicators,  etc.).
Keefer  and Stasavage  (1999)  report empirical  results using CHECKS1, from the DPI,
political constraints from Henisz, and Executive  Constraints, a subjective  variable  from Polity
III. The key conclusions  are generally  robust to which variable is used (central  bank
independence  matters more in the presence  of checks  and balances). However, these  variables
are not so closely  correlated  that one can assume  robustness.39
Conclusion
This database is the product of an effort to bring systematic, cross-country information
on political institutions  within easy reach of researchers investigating comparative  political
economy.  We have found no other source of information  that provides  as much objective
data on these issues. Others,  including some of the authors of this paper, have previously used
in other work the data sources relied upon to construct  this data these variables (see Clague, et
al., 1996, or Durham,  1999). However, we have found no case where all of the information
has been compiled, and we have identified many variables that have never been collected.
Examples of these are the variables identifying party  orienitation, party affiliation with the
government  or opposition,  the military affiliation of the executive or minister  of defense.
The early part of the paper outlined a subset of the questions that the Database of
Political Institutions  can potentially illuminate.  They stretch across political science and
economics, ranging from the determinants  of democratic  consolidation, the political
conditions  for economic reform, and the political  and institutional  roots of corruption,  to the
appropriate and institutionally-sensitive  design of economic policy recommendations.  To
enhance the availability of the DPI for these purposes, it will be placed on several websites,
particularly the political  economy website of Harvard  University and the website of the
World Bank's Development  Economics Data Group.40
Annex 1: List of Variables
The Database  on Political Institutions (DPI)  is a large new cross-country  database  of political
institutions that covers 177  countries over 21 years, 1975  - 1995. This database  was prepared
by Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Robert Cull, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer,  and Patrick
Walsh of the Development Research  Group of the World Bank. When using  this database,
please  cite the current paper.
General Variables
Country Code COUNTRYC
International  Financial  Statistics  code IFS
Year YEAR
Chief Executive  Variables
Direct Presidential  (0);  strong president elected  by assembly  (1);  Parliamentary  (2)  SYSTEM
How many years in office YRSOFFC
Is there a finite term in office?  (1 if yes, 0  if no)  FINIT'ITRM
Years  left in curent  term  YRCURNT
If there are fonnal restraints  on his term (NA if not),  can he serve multiple  terms? MULTPL?
Is Chief Executive  a military officer? MILITARY
Is defense  minister  a military officer? DEFMIN
President got what % of votes in the 1st/only round? PERCENT1
President got what % of votes in the final round?  PERCENTL
Party of chief  executive  has been how long in office  PRTYIN
Chief Executive's Party
Name of party, if any EXECME
Right (R);  Left (L); Center (C);  Not applicable  (0)  EXECRLC
Nationalist (1 if yes) EXECNAT
Rural (1 if yes) EXECRURL
Regional  (1 if yes) EXECREG
Religious  (1 not specified,  CH:Christian, CA: Catholic, IS:  Islamic,  HD: Hindu, BD: Buddhist,  JW:
Jewish,  0:  otherwise) EXECREL
Time since  formation under this name EXECAGE
Does party of executive  control all relevant  houses?  ALLHOUSE
In systems  with both non-ceremonial  PM and President,  what is the party affiliation  of the one not called  Chief
Executive? NONCHIEF
Party Variables  in the Legislature
Herfndahl Index for Govt.  HERFGOV41
Government fractionalization  (chance  that two random draws will produce legislators  from different  parties).
GOVFRAC
# of Govt. Seats NUMGOV
Largest  Government  Party
Name 1GOVME
Seats  IGOVSEAT
Right (R);  Left (L);  Center (C); Not applicable  (0)  IGOVRL'C
Nationalist (1 if yes) 1GOVNAT
Rural (1 if yes) IGOVRURL
Regional  (1 if yes) IGOVREG
Religious  (1 not specified,  CH:Christian, CA: Catholic,  IS:  Islamic,  HD: Hindu, BD: Buddhist,  JW:
Jewish, 0: otherwise) IGOVREL
Time since  formation under this name IGOVAGE
2nd  Largest  Government  Party
Name 2GOVME
Seats  2GOVSEAT
Right (R);  Left (L);  Center (C);  Not applicable (0)  2GOVRLC
Nationalist (1 if yes)  2GOVNAT
Rural (1 if yes) 2GOVRURL
Regional (1 if yes) 2GOVREG
Religious  (1 not specified,  CH:Christian, CA: Catholic,  IS: Islamic,  HD: Hindu, BD: Buddhist,  JW:
Jewish, 0: other-wise)  2GOVREL
Time since  formation under this name 2GOVAGE
3rd Largest  Government  Party
Name 3GOVME
Seats  3GOVSEAT
-Right  (R);  Left (L);  Center (C);  Not applicable  (0)  3GOVRI.C
Nationalist (1 if yes)  3GOVNAT
Rural (1 if yes) 3GOVRURL
Regional (1 if yes) 3GOVREG
Religious  (1 not specified,  CH:Christian, CA: Catholic, IS:  Islamic,  HD: Hindu, BD: Buddhist,  JW:
Jewish, 0:  otherwise)  3GOVREL
Time since  formation under this name 3GOVAGE
Number of other government  parties GOVOTH
Number of other government  party Seats GOVOTHST
Herfindahl Index for Opposition HERFOPP42
Opposition fractionalization  (chance  that two random draws will produce legislators  from different  parties).
OPPFRAC
# of Opp. Seats NUMOPP
Largest Opposition Party
Name Largest  Opposition Party 1OPPME
Seats  Largest  Opposition Party 1OPPSEAT
Right (R);  Left (L);  Center (C);  Not applicable  (0)  Largest  Opposition Party 1OPPRLC
Nationalist (1 if yes) IOPPNAT
Rural (1  if yes) IOPPRURL
Regional  (1 if yes) lOPPREG
Religious  (1 not specified,  CH:Christian, CA: Catholic, IS: Islamic,  HD: Hindu, BD: Buddhist,  JW:
Jewish,  0: otherwise) IOPPREL
Time since  formation under this name lOPPAGE
2nd Largest Opposition  Party
Name 2nd 2OPPME
Seats  2nd 2OPPSEAT
3rd Largest Opposition  Party
Name 3rd 3OPPME
Seats  3rd 3OPPSEAT
Number of other opposition parties OPPOTH
Number of other opposition party seats OPPOTHST
Number of Parties non-aligned/allegiance  unknown ULPRTY
Seats  non-aligned/allegiance  unknown NUMUL
Herfindahl  Index Total HERFTOT
Total fractionalization  (chance  that two random draws will produce legislators  from different  parties) FRAC
Does one-opp.  party have majority in House OPPMAJH
Does one opp. party have majority in Senate OPPMAJS
Details on Legislature
When were legislative  elections held (number records month, 13 indicates  unknown month) DATELEG
When were executive  elections  held (number records month, 13 indicates  unknown month)  DATEEXEC
Majority (number of government  seats divided  by total seats) MAJ
Average  Age of Parties PARTYAGE
Is there a legislative  election?  ("1" if yes) LEGELEC
Is there an executive  election?  ("1" if yes) EXELEC
Is executive  party special  interest? EXECSPEC43
Is 1st gov. party special interest?  GOVSPEC
Are any coalition parties special interest?  COALSPEC
Electoral Rules
Legislative  Index of Political  Competitiveness LIEC
Executive  Index of Political  Competitiveness EIEC
mean district magnitude  (House) MDMH
mean district magnitude  (Senate)  MDMS
Number of senate/ (number of house + number of senate) S/S+H
Plurality? (1 if yes, 0  if no)  PLURALTY
Proportional Representation?  (1 if yes, 0 if no) PR
If Plurality and Proportional Representation  which governs  the majority/all of the House seats?  (1 if Plurality,
O if Proportional) HOUSESYS
If Plurality and Proportional Representation  which governs  the majority/all of the Senate  seats?  (1 if Plurality,
O if Proportional)  SENSYS
What is the vote threshold for representation?  THRESH
Is the D'Hondt  system used? (1 if yes, 0 if no)  DHONDT
Are closed lists used? (1 if yes, 0  if no)  CL
Candidate  selection: national(1), sub-national(2), primary  (3) SELECT
Were vote fraud or candidate  intimidation serious enough to affect  the outcome of elections?  FRAUD
Stability and Checks &:  Balances
Longest tenure of a veto player  TENLONG
Shortest  tenure of a veto player  TENSHORT
Tenure  of system of government  if democratic; tenure  of chief executive otherwise  TENSYS
Index of Political Cohesion (based on Roubini,  Sachs 1989) IPCOH
Number  of veto players  CHECKS  I
Checks-2- Checki, + 1 for each veto player whose orientation  is closer to opp than gov CHECKS2
Maximum difference  of orientation among Govt. parties (0-2) POLARIZ
% veto players  dropping  from Govt., assume  Senate  changes STABS
% veto players  dropping  from Govt., assume  Senate  doesn't change STABNS
Federalism
Are there autonomous  regions? AUTTON
Are the municipal  governments  locally elected? MUNI
Are the state/ province  governments  locally  elected? STATE
Do Sub-national  govts.  have  extensive  taxing, spending  or regulatory  authority?  AULIOR
Are the constituencies  of the senators the states/provinces? STCONST44
References
Agora Telematica  website  of political parties. Wilfried Dierksen, editor.
(www.agora.stm.it/elections/parties.htm.)
Alesina,  Alberto, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Philip Swagel  (1996). "Political  Instability
and Economic  Growth." Journal of Economic  Growth 1 (une).
Banks,  Arthur S.  The Political Handbook of the World, 1986-1996.  CSA Publications.
Binghampton, 1986-1996.
Clague,  Christopher, Philip Keefer,  Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson (1996).  'Property and
Contract Rights  under Democracy and Dictatorship." The  Journal  of Economic  Growth
1:2, 243-276  (une).
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (1999). "Justice-seeking  and loot-seeking  in civil war.'
Working paper, Development  Research  Group, The World Bank.
Cox, Gary W. (1997).  Making Votes  Count: Strategic  Coordination  in the World's  Electoral
Systems. New York: Cambridge.
and Mathew D. McCubbins (forthcoming). "The  Institutional Determinants of
Economic Policy Outcomes," in Structure  and Policy  in Presidential  Democracies,
Stephan Haggard  and Mathew D. McCubbins, eds.
Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1996). "The Determinants of Success  of Special  Interests
in Redistributive  Politics." 7Te  journal of Politics  58:4,  1132-55.
Durham, J. Benson (1999).  "Economic Growth and Political Regimes." Journal  of Economic
Growth  4, 81 - 111 (March).
The Europa Year Book,  Vols. 1 & 2, 1977-1984,  1990-1994.  Europa Publications Ltd.
London, 1977-1984,1990-1994.
Ferree, Karen E. and Smita Singh (1999). "Institutional Change and Economic Performance
in Africa, 1970-1995."  Paper presented at the 1999  meetings of the American Political
- Science  Association,  Atlanta, Georgia.
Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers  and Will H. Moore (1998).  Polity III Codebook. Center for
Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science,  University of Colorado,
Boulder. Polity m available  through the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social  Research.
Heinisz, Witold (1997). "The Institutional Environment for Growth." Mimeo, The Wharton
School.45
Hunter, Brian, current editor (issues  back  to 1864).  The  Statesman's  year-book  [Statistical  and
historical  annual of the states  of the  worldfor the year.  J. New York: St. Martin's Press,
International Parliamentary Union, PARLINE database  website.
(www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp)
Keefer,  Philip (1999). 'Political institutions and crisis: The effects  of political checks  and
balances  on the dynamics  of financial  sector distress." Paper prepared  for the meetings
of the Western Economics  Association,  July 1999.
and Stephen Knack (1997).  "Why  don't poor countries catch  up? A cross-national  test
of an institutional explanation.' Economic  Inquiry 35:3,  590-602  July).
and David Stasavage  (1999). "Bureaucratic  Delegation and Political Institutions: When
are Independent Central Banks  Irrelevant?"  Mimeo, The World Bank (November).
Keesing's  record  of world events  (various  years). London:  Longman, (weekly).
Lane,  Jan-Erik, David H. McKay and Kenneth Newton (various  issues). Political  data
handbook:  OECD countries.  New York:  Oxford University Press.
Laver, Michael  and Kenneth Shepsle  (1996). Making  and Breaking  Governments. New York:
Cambridge  University Press.
London Institute of World Affairs (1947  - 84). The  year book  of world  affairs.  London:
Stevens.
North, Douglass  and Barry Weingast  (1989). "Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing  Public Choice in Seventeenth  Century England."
Journal  of Economic  History 49:4,  808-32  (December)
Political  Parties  ofAfrica and the  Middle  East:  a Reference  Guide. Longman Current Affairs
Series. Detroit, 1993.
Politica4Parties  of Eastern  Europe,  Russia,  and the Successcor  States:  a Reference  Guide.-  -Longman
Current Affairs  Series. Harlow, UK, 1994.
Pritchett, Lant and Jonah Gelbach (1997). "More for the Poor is Less  for the Poor: The
Politics of Targeting." The World Bank,  Policy Research  Working Paper, No. 1799.
Rasmusen,  Eric and Mark J. Ramseyer  (1994). "Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: a
coordination game among  rational legislators."  Public  Choice 78:305-27  (March).
Roubini, Nouriel and Jeffrey Sachs  (1989). "Political and Economic  Determinants of Budget
Deficits  in the Industrial Democracies." European  Economic  Review 33, 903-938.
Schady,  Norbert (1998). "Seeking  Votes: The Political Economy of Expenditures  by the46
Peruvian Social Fund: (FONCODES),  1991-95." Policy Research Working Paper
2166, The World Bank.
Shugart, Mathew Soberg (1995). "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional  Sources of Divided
Presidential Government."  American Political Science  Review 89:2, 327 - 343 June).
and John Carey (1992). Presidents  and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral
Dynamics.  New York:  Cambridge University Press.
Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993). "Constitutional  Frameworks  and Democratic
Consolidation:  Parliamentarism  versus Presidentialism."  World Politics 46, 1-22
(October).
United States Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate  of Intelligence (various issues).
Handbook of the nations: a bMef/guide  to the economy, government, land, demographics,
communications, and national defense  establishment of each of 223 nations and other
political entities. Detroit:  Gale, 1987.
Weingast, Barry (1998). 'Political  Stability and Civil War: Institutions,  Commitment,  and
American Democracy."  In Analytic Narratives, Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret
Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast, eds. (Princeton: Princeton
University  Press).Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2265  The Political  Economy  of Distress  Paola  Bongini  January  2000  R. Vo
In East Asian Financial  Institutions  Stijn Claessens  33722
Giovanni  Ferri
WPS2266  The Impact  of Adult Deaths  on  Martha  Ainsworth  January  2000  S. Fallon
Children's  Health  in Northwestern  Innocent  Semaii  38009
Tanzania
WPS2267 Do High  Interest  Rates  Defend  Aart Kraay  January  2000  R. Bonfield
Currencies  during Speculative  Attacks?  31248
WPS2268  The Structure  of Social  Disparities  Deon  Filmer  January  2000  S. Fallon
In Education:  Gender  and  Wealth  38009
WPS2269 Context  Is Everything:  Measuring  Nauro  F. Campos  January  2000  J. Victor
Institutional  Change  in Transition  36549
Economies
WPS2270  The  Optimal  Income  Tax  When  Waly  Wane  January  2000  H. Sladovich
Poverty  Is a Public  "Bad"  37698
WPS2271  Corporate  Risk  around  the World  Stiin Claessens  January  2000  R.  Vo
Simeon  Djankov  33722
Tatiana  Nenova
WPS2272 Ownership  versus  Environment:  Ann  P. Bartel  January  2000  S.  Fallon
Disentangling  the Sources  of Public  Ann E. Harrison  38009
Sector Inefficiency
WPS2273  The  Value  of Preventing  Malaria  Maureen  L.  Cropper  January  2000  T. Tourougui




WPS2274 How  Access  to Urban  Potable  Water  Anqing  Shi  January  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
and  Sewerage  Connections  Affects  37644
Child  Mortality
WPS2275  Who  Gained  from  Vietnam's  Boom  Paul  Glewwe  January  2000  P. Sader
In the 1990s?  An Analysis  of Poverty  Michele  Gragnolati  33902
An Analysis  of Poverty  and  Hassan  Zaman
Inequality  Trends
WPS2276  Evaluating  the Case  for Export  Arvind  Panagariya  January  2000  L.  Tabada
Subsidies  36896Policy  Research Working  Papeir Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2277 Determinants  of Bulgarian  Brady  Nina  Budina  January  2000  N. Budina
Bond  Prices:  An  Empirical  Tzvetan  Mantchev  82045
Assessment
WPS2278 Liquidity  Constraints  and Investment Nina  Budina  January  2000  N. Budina
in Transition  Economies:  The  Case  Harry  Garretsen  82045
of Bulgaria
WPS2279 Broad  Roads  in a Thin  Country:  Andres  G6mez-Lobo  January  2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Infrastructure  Concessions  in Chile  Sergio  Hinojosa  36370
WPS2280  Willingness  to Pay  for Air  Quality  Hua  Wang  January  2000  R. Yazigi
Improvements  in Sofia,  Bulgaria  Dale  Whittington  37176
WPS2281 External  Sustainability:  A Stock  C6sar  Calder6n  January  2000  H. Vargas
Equilibrium  Perspective  Norman  Loayza  38546
WPS2282 Managing  Fiscal  Risk  in Bulgaria  Hana  Polackova  Brixi  January  2000  L.  Zlaoui
Sergei  Shatalov  33100
Leila  Zlaoui